CIA-sponsored coup against Mossadegh

All the Shah's Men ~ Stephen Kinzer
Professor of political science at Northwestern University
James Risen, a reporter on the New York Times, deserves credit for bringing much of the truth to light.
~Concerning Britain's threats against Iran re the Anglo-Iranian Oil company-- "Truman's position found much support in the American press. the Wall Street Journal lamented Britain's reliance on "nineteength century threats." The Philadelphia Inquirer warned that a British invasion of Iran might bring "a quick outbreak of World War III." A popular CBS commentator, howard K. Smith, asserted that many countries in the Middle East and beyond supported Iran, and that an invasion might "stair all the Southern Asians to a rebellion against the Western foreigner and cause serious trouble for both Britain and the U.S." (p.113)

~"Not a conspirator by nature, Mossadegh had an almost childlike faith in the sincerity of most other people. he was also a very decent, even chivalrous man who appreciated form, ceremony, and diplomacy. Despite the troubles of recent months, he had soft spot for Americans. if [Kermit] Roosevelt could find a way to exploit these traits in his adversary's character, he
might throw him off balance or force him to make a false move. It was a classic challenge of psychological warfare...(p. 174)

~Mossadegh died march 5, 1967, aged 85. "The Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, which later changed its name to British Petroleum, tried to return to its old position in Iran, but public opinion was so opposed that the new government could not permit it. Besides, the logic of power dictated that since the U.S. had done the dirty work of overthrowing Mossadegh, American companies should share in the spoils. Ultimately, an international consortium was organized to assume the rich concession. Anglo-Iranian held 40% of the shares, five American companies held another 40, and the remainder was distributed [elsewhere...](p. 196)

"...In the years that followed, Mohammad Reza Shah became increasingly isolated and dictatorial. he cruished dissent by whatever means necessary and spent large amounts of money on weaponry... he had ...[much] free cash becuse of the sharp increase il oil prices during those years. The $4 billion that Iran received from the consortium in 1973 reached $19 billion just two years later...(p. 196)

"In one of the most stunning political collapses of the 20th century, the Shah was forced to flee his homeland in January 1979. This time the CIA was not able to return him to his throne. The next year he died in Egypt, reviled by almost everyone. Ayatollah Khomeini replaced him as arbiter of Iran's destiny........(p. 197)


"The world has paid a heavy price for the lack of democracy in most of the Middle East. Operation Ajax [the coup] taught tyrants and aspiring tyrants there that the world's most powerful governments were willing to tolerate limitless oppression as long as oppressive regimes were friendly to the West and to Western oil companies. That helped tilt that political balance in a vast region away from freedom and towards dictatorship." (p. 204)

"How did Iran reach the tragic crossroads of August 1953? the main responsibility lies with the obtuse neocolonialism that guided the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company and with the British government's willingness to accept it...The men who ran the company, and the government officials who coddled them, were frozen in their imperial mindset and contemptuous of Iranians and their aspirations. Dean Acheson had it exactly right when he wrote: 'Never had so few lost so much so stupidly and so fast.'" (p. 206)

"The election in the U.S. [i.e., election of Dwight Eisenhower] was esp. significant because it brought John Foster Dulles and Allen Dulles to power. They were driven men, intensely focused on the worldwide communist threat. Their decision to make iran the first battleground of their crusade may or may not have been wise, but they deserve to be judged harshly for the way they made it. Even before taking their oaths of office, the brothers had convinced themselves beyond all doubt that Mossadegh must go. They never even considered the possibility that a coup might be a bad idea or that it might have negative consequences. History might view their action more favorably if it had been the result of serious, open-minded reflection and debate. Instead, it sprang from petulant impatience..." (p. 208)

"Forty-seven years after the coup [i.e. 2000] the US officially acknowledged its involvement. President Clinton, who had embarked on what proved to be an unsuccessful effort to improve American relations with Iran, approved a carefully worded statement that could be read as an apology. Sec. of State Madeleine Albright delivered it during a speech in Washington--[quote]"The Eisenhower administration believed its actions were justified for strategic reasons. But the coup was clearly a setback for iran's political development. And it is easy to see now why many Iranians continue to resent this intervention by America in their internal affairs."[close quote] (p. 212)

Historians have tended to vindicate those who opposed the use of force against Mossadegh. Truman predicted that mishandling the Iran crisis would produce "a disaster to the free world" Henry Grady, his ambassador in Tehran, warned that a coup would be "utter folly" and would push Iran into "a state of disintegration."